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Summary 
Any comprehensive approach to substantially reduce greenhouse gases must address the world’s 
dependency on coal for one-quarter of its energy demand, including almost half of its electricity 
demand. To maintain coal in the world’s energy mix in a carbon-constrained future would require 
development of a technology to capture and store its carbon dioxide emissions. This situation 
suggests to some that any greenhouse gas reduction program be delayed until such carbon capture 
technology has been demonstrated. However, technological innovation and the demands of a 
carbon control regime are interlinked; a technology policy is no substitute for environmental 
policy and should be developed in concert with it. 
Much of the debate about developing and commercializing carbon capture technology has 
focused on the role of research, development, and deployment (technology-push mechanisms). 
However, for technology to be fully commercialized, it must also meet a market demand—a 
demand created either through a price mechanism or a regulatory requirement (demand-pull 
mechanisms). Any conceivable carbon capture technology for coal-fired power plants will 
increase the cost of electricity generation from affected plants because of efficiency losses. 
Therefore, few companies are likely to install such technology until they are required to, either by 
regulation or by a carbon price. Regulated industries may find their regulators reluctant to accept 
the risks and cost of installing technology that is not required. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has invested millions of dollars since 1997 in carbon capture 
technology research and development (R&D), and the question remains whether it has been too 
much, too little, or about the right amount. In addition to appropriating funds each year for the 
DOE program, Congress supported R&D investment through provisions for loan guarantees and 
tax credits. Congress also authorized a significant expansion of carbon capture and sequestration 
(CCS) spending at DOE in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Funding for 
carbon capture technology has increased substantially as a result of enactment of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
Legislation introduced in the 111th and 110th Congresses invokes the symbolism of the Manhattan 
project of the 1940s and the Apollo program of the 1960s to frame proposals for large-scale 
energy policy initiatives that include developing CCS technology. However, commercialization of 
technology and integration of technology into the private market were not goals of either the 
Manhattan project or Apollo program. 
Finally, it should be noted that the status quo for coal with respect to climate change legislation 
isn’t necessarily the same as “business as usual.” The financial markets and regulatory authorities 
appear to be hedging their bets on the outcomes of any federal legislation with respect to 
greenhouse gas reductions, and becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the risk of a coal-fired 
power plant with or without carbon capture capacity. The lack of a regulatory scheme presents 
numerous risks to any research and development effort designed to develop carbon capture 
technology. Ultimately, it also presents a risk to the future of coal. 
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Introduction: Coal and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
The world meets 25% of its primary energy demand with coal, a number projected to increase 
steadily over the next 25 years. Overall, coal is responsible for about 20% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.1 With respect to carbon dioxide (CO2), the most prevalent greenhouse gas, coal 
combustion was responsible for 41% of the world’s CO2 emissions in 2005 (11 billion metric 
tons).2 
Coal is particularly important for electricity supply. In 2005, coal was responsible for about 46% 
of the world’s power generation, including 50% of the electricity generated in the United States, 
89% of the electricity generated in China, and 81% of the electricity generated in India.3 Coal-
fired power generation is estimated to increase 2.3% annually through 2030, with resulting CO2 
emissions estimated to increase from 7.9 billion metric tons per year to 13.9 billion metric tons 
per year. For example, during 2006, it is estimated that China added over 90 gigawatts (GW) of 
new coal-fired generating capacity, potentially adding an additional 500 million metric tons of 
CO2 to the atmosphere annually.4 
Developing a means to control coal-derived greenhouse gas emissions is an imperative if serious 
reductions in worldwide emissions are to occur in the foreseeable future. Developing technology 
to accomplish this task in an environmentally, economically, and operationally acceptable manner 
has been an ongoing interest of the federal government and energy companies for a decade, but 
no commercial system to capture and store these emissions is currently available for large-scale 
coal-fired power plants. 
Arguably the most economic and technologically challenging part of the carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) equation is capturing the carbon and preparing it for transport and storage.5 
Depending on site-specific conditions, the capture component of a CCS system can be the 
dominant cost-variable, and the component that could be improved most dramatically by further 
technological advancement. As indicated in Table 1, capture costs could be 5-10 times the cost of 
storage. Breakthrough technologies that substantially reduce the cost of capturing CO2 from 
existing or new power plants, for example by 50% or more, would immediately reshape the 
economics of CCS. Moreover, technological breakthroughs would change the economics of CCS 
irrespective of a regulatory framework that emerges and governs how CO2 is transported away 
from the power plant and sequestered underground. 
                                                             
1
 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Coal and Climate Change Facts, (2008), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/coalfacts.cfm. 
2
 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights (2007), pp. 593. 
3
 World, China and India statistics from International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India 
Insights, (2007), pp. 592, 596, and 600; United States statistics from Energy Information Administration, Annual 
Energy Review: 2005 (July 2006), p. 228. 
4
 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Coal and Climate Change Facts (2008), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/coalfacts.cfm. Capacity factor derived by CRS from data presented, 
assuming plants would operate in baseload mode with 70% capacity factors. 
5
 For a general discussion of carbon capture and sequestration, see CRS Report RL33801, Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration (CCS), by Peter Folger. 
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Table 1. Expected Costs of CCS Technology Elements 
CCS Element $/Metric Ton of CO2 
Capture $40-$80 
Storage $3-$8 
Monitoring and Verification $0.2-$1.0 
Source: S. Julio Friedmann, Carbon Capture and Sequestration As a Major Greenhouse Gas Abatement Option 
(November 2007), p. 11. 
Note: Capture and storage costs are very site-specific. These estimates reflect the magnitude of difference 
between capture and storage costs; actual site-specific costs could vary substantially from these estimates. 
Estimates do not include any transportation costs. 
In contrast, the cost of transporting CO2 and sequestering it underground is likely less dependent 
on technological breakthroughs than on other factors, such as: 
• the costs of construction materials and labor (in the case of pipelines for CO2 
transport); 
• the degree of geologic characterization required to permit sequestration; 
• the requirements for measuring, monitoring, and verifying permanent CO2 
storage; 
• the costs of acquiring surface and subsurface rights to store CO2; 
• costs of insurance and long-term liability; and 
• other variables driving the cost of transportation and sequestration.6 
That is not to say that the transportation and storage components of CCS are independent of cost 
and timing. Depending on the degree of public acceptance of a large-scale CCS enterprise, the 
transportation and sequestration costs could be very large, and it may take years to reach 
agreement on the regulatory framework that would guide long-term CO2 sequestration. But the 
variables driving cost and timing for the transportation and storage of CO2 are less amenable to 
technological solution. 
This report examines the current effort to develop technology that would capture CO2. First, the 
report outlines the current status of carbon capture technology. Second, the report examines the 
role of government in developing that technology, both in terms of creating a market for carbon 
capture technology and encouraging development of the technology. Finally, the report concludes 
with a discussion of implications of capture technology for climate change legislation. 
                                                             
6
 For more information on policy issues related to the transportation of CO2, see CRS Report RL33971, Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2) Pipelines for Carbon Sequestration: Emerging Policy Issues, and CRS Report RL34316, Pipelines for 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Control: Network Needs and Cost Uncertainties, both by Paul W. Parfomak and Peter Folger. 
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Background: What Is Carbon Capture Technology 
and What Is Its Status? 
Major reductions in coal-fired CO2 emissions would require either pre-combustion, combustion 
modification, or post-combustion devices to capture the CO2. Because there is currently over 300 
GW of coal-fired electric generating capacity in the United States and about 600 GW in China, a 
retrofittable post-combustion capture device could have a substantial market, depending on the 
specifics of any climate change program. The following discussion provides a brief summary of 
technology under development that may be available in the near term. It is not an exhaustive 
survey of the technological initiatives currently underway in this area, but illustrative of the range 
of activity. Funding for current government research and development activities to improve these 
technologies and move them to commercialization are discussed later. 
Post-Combustion CO2 Capture 
Post-combustion CO2 capture involves treating the burner exhaust gases immediately before they 
enter the stack. The advantage of this approach is that it would allow retrofit at existing facilities 
that can accommodate the necessary capturing hardware and ancillary equipment. In this sense, it 
is like retrofitting post-combustion sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), or particulate 
control on an existing facility. A simplified illustration of this process is provided in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Simplified Illustration of Post-Combustion CO2 Capture 
 
Source: Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage. Figure available at http://www.geos.ed.ac.uk/sccs/capture/
postcombustion.html. 
Post-combustion processes capture the CO2 from the exhaust gas through the use of distillation, 
membranes, or absorption (physical or chemical). The most widely used capture technology is the 
chemical absorption process using amines (typically monoethanolamine (MEA)) available for 
industrial applications. Pilot-plant research on using ammonia (also an amine) as the chemical 
solvent is currently underway with demonstration plants announced. These approaches to carbon 
capture are discussed below. Numerous other solvent-based post-combustion processes are in the 
bench-scale stage.7 
Monoethanolamine (MEA) 
The MEA CO2 carbon capture process is the most proven and tested capture process available. 
The basic design (common to most solvent-based processes) involves passing the exhaust gases 
                                                             
7
 For a useful summary of carbon capture technology, see Steve Blankinship, “The Evolution of Carbon Capture 
Technology Part 1,” Power Engineering (March 2008). 
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through an absorber where the MEA interacts with the CO2 and absorbs it. The now CO2-rich 
MEA is then pumped to a stripper (also called a regenerator) which uses steam to separate the 
CO2 from the MEA. Water is removed from the resulting CO2, which is compressed while the 
regenerated MEA is purged of any contaminants (such as ammonium sulfate) and recirculated 
back to the absorber. The process can be optimized to remove 90-95% of the CO2 from the flue 
gas.8 
Although proven on an industrial scale, it has not been applied to the typically larger volumes of 
flue gas streams created by coal-fired power plants. The technology has three main drawbacks 
that would make current use on a coal-fired power plant quite costly. First is the need to divert 
steam away from its primary use—generating electricity—to be used instead for stripping CO2 
from MEA. A second related problem is the energy required to compress the CO2 after it’s 
captured—needed for transport through pipelines—which lowers overall power plant efficiency 
and increases generating costs. A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
estimated the efficiency losses from the installation of MEA from 25%-28% for new construction 
and 36%-42% for retrofit on an existing plant.9 This loss of efficiency comes in addition to the 
necessary capital and operations and maintenance cost of the equipment and reagents. For new 
construction, the increase in electricity generating cost on a levelized basis would be 60%-70%, 
depending on the boiler technology.10 In the case of retrofit plants where the capital costs were 
fully amortized, the MEA capture process would increase generating costs on a levelized basis by 
about 220%-250%.11 
A third drawback is degradation of the amine through either overheating (over 205 degrees 
Fahrenheit [F]) in the absorber or through oxidation from oxygen introduced in the wash water, 
chemical slurry, or flue gas that reacts with the MEA. For example, residual SO2 in the flue gas 
will react with the MEA to form ammonium sulfate that must be purged from the system.12 This 
could be a serious problem for existing plants that do not have highly efficient flue gas 
desulfurization (FGD) or selective catalytic reduction (SCR) devices (or none), requiring either 
upgrading of existing FGD and SCR equipment, or installation of them in addition to the MEA 
process. 
MEA-Based Solvents (Fluor) 
One approach to addressing the shortcomings of MEA identified above is to use an MEA-based 
formulation of different amines. The goal of the formulation is improve the reaction rates and 
CO2 carrying capacity of the solvent under typical power plant conditions. One such proprietary 
amine-based technology has been developed by Fluor (called Economine FG Plus).13 Fluor states 
                                                             
8
 Ryan M. Dailey and Donald S. Shattuck, “An Introduction to CO2 Capture and Sequestration Technology, Utility 
Engineering” (May 2008), p. 3. 
9
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (2007), p. 147. Hereafter 
referred to as MIT, The Future of Coal. 
10
 Levelized cost is the present value of the total cost of building and operating a generating plant over its economic 
life, converted to equal annual payments. Costs are levelized in real dollars (i.e., adjusted to remove the impact of 
inflation). 
11
 MIT, The Future of Coal, pp. 27, 149. 
12
 Ryan M. Dailey and Donald S. Shattuck, “An Introduction to CO2 Capture and Sequestration Technology, Utility 
Engineering” (May 2008), p. 4. 
13
 Satish Reddy, Dennis Johnson,, and John Gilmartin, Fluror’s Economine FG PlusSM Technology for CO2 Capture at 
Coal-fired Power Plants, presented at Power Plant Air Pollutant Control “Mega” Symposium, Baltimore (August 25-
(continued...) 
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that its MEA-based solvent is specially formulated to recover CO2 from low pressure, oxygen-
containing streams, such as boiler stack gases found in conventional coal-fired power plants. The 
treatment process is similar to generic gas treating processes, using simple, time-tested gas 
treating equipment. To address contamination of the solvent, the Fluor technology focuses on 
cleaning up impurities in the flue gas (e.g., SO2, NOx, hydrochloric acid, and hydrofluoric acid) 
in order to inhibit the formulation of ammonium sulfate and other heat-stable salts.14 Thus the 
process requires installation of modern SO2 (with additional enhancements), NOx, Hg, and 
particulate controls upstream of the carbon capture technology to address the impurities. Solvent 
temperature issues are dealt with through the use of an intercooler system within the absorber. 
Finally, other enhancements in the process reduce the process energy consumption.  
Fluor’s technology has significant experience on a small commercial scale, including the only 
CO2 recovery unit that has operated on the flue gas of a natural gas-fired turbine power plant 
under typical power plant conditions. Between 1991 and 2005, the Fluor facility at the 
Bellingham, MA, power plant captured 360 shorts tons of CO2 daily for use in the food and 
beverage industry.15 In September 2009, NRG Energy and Fluor announced that Economine FG 
Plus would be installed on a 60 megawatt (MW) slipstream16 at NRG’s WA Parish plant (Unit 7) 
in Texas, with a plan to be operational by 2013. The captured CO2 would be sold or used for 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR). DOE will provide up to $154 million toward the project. 
Mixed Amine Solvents (HTC Purenergy) 
Other combinations of amines and other chemicals have been developed to increase the efficiency 
and reduce the energy requirements of capture processes. Using blends of water, amines, and 
other chemicals developed by the University of Regina’s International Test Centre for CO2 
Capture, the Purenergy CCS Capture System is designed to be modular, shop-built, and 
transported to the site.17 Currently a module is designed to handle the flow of a 50 MW facility 
with multi-unit train installation possible.  
In December 2009, a commercial demonstration for Purenergy CCS was announced by Basin 
Electric and HTC Pure Energy, using a 20 MW slipstream at Basin Electric’s Antelope Valley 
Station in North Dakota. Commercial operation is planned for 2012. The CO2 produced will be 
transported via an existing CO2 pipeline to Canada for use in EOR.  
Chilled Ammonia (Alstom) 
An approach to mitigating the oxidation problem identified above is to use an ammonia-based 
solvent rather than MEA. Ammonia is an amine that absorbs CO2 at a slower rate than MEA. In a 
                                                             
(...continued) 
28, 2008).  
14
 Heat-stable salts are acid anions with a stronger acid strength than the acid gases that are removed from the process 
gas. These anions may bind to the usable amine and then therefore make it unavailable for acid gas absorption; hence 
the need to inhibit their formulation or to purge them from the system. 
15
 Satish Reddy, Dennis Johnson,, and John Gilmartin, Fluror’s Economine FG PlusSM Technology for CO2 Capture at 
Coal-fired Power Plants, presented at Power Plant Air Pollutant Control “Mega” Symposium, Baltimore (August 25-
28, 2008), pp. 3-5.  
16
 Slipstream refers to pilot testing at an operating power plant using a portion of the flue gas stream. 
17
 HTC Pureenergy, CO2—Source to Sink, presentation (April 2008). Also see webite at http://www.htcenergy.com.  
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chilled ammonia process, the flue gas temperature is reduced from about 130 degrees F to about 
35-60 degrees F. This lower temperature has two benefits: (1) it condenses the residual water in 
the flue gas, which minimizes the volume of flue gas entering the absorber; and (2) it causes 
pollutants in the flue gas, such as SO2, to drop out, reducing the need for substantial upgrading of 
upstream control devices.18 Using a slurry of ammonium carbonate and ammonium bicarbonate, 
the solvent absorbs more than 90% of the CO2 in the flue gas. The resulting CO2-rich ammonia is 
regenerated and the CO2 is stripped from the ammonia mixture under pressure (300 pounds per 
square inch [psi] compared with 15 psi using MEA), reducing the energy necessary to compress 
the CO2 for transportation (generally around 1,500 psi).19 
The chilled ammonia process is a proprietary process, owned by Alstom. In collaboration with 
American Electric Power (AEP) and RWE AG (the largest electricity producer in Germany), 
Alstom began operating its technology on a 20 MW slipstream at AEP’s Mountaineer plant in 
West Virginia in September 2009 and injecting the captured CO2 into deep saline formations 
onsite in October 2009.20 In March 2010, AEP received an award from DOE to cover as much as 
half the estimated $668 million cost required to scale up the Mountaineer project to capture and 
store CO2 from a 235 MW slipstream (approximately 1.5 million tons annually). Once 
commercial viability is demonstrated at Mountaineer, AEP plans to install the technology at its 
450 MW Northeastern Station in Oologah, OK, early in the next decade. The captured gas would 
be used for EOR. The target is for full commercialization in 2015. 
Ammonia (Powerspan) 
A second ammonia-based, regenerative process for CO2 capture from existing coal-fired facilities 
does not involve chilling the flue gas before it enters the absorber. Using higher flue gas 
temperatures increases the CO2 absorption rate in the absorber and, therefore, the CO2 removal. 
However, the higher flue gas temperatures also mean that upgrades to existing FGD devices 
would be necessary.21 
This process, called ECO2, is being developed by Powerspan.22 Powerspan announced test results 
for its 1 MW pilot unit, located at FirstEnergy Corp’s R.E. Burger Plant, in December 2009. The 
pilot plant tests suggest that carbon capture and compression costs with ECO2 are below $50 a ton 
at 90% reduction.23  
Pre-Combustion CO2 Capture 
Currently, a requirement for the pre-combustion capture of CO2 is the use of Integrated 
Gasification Combined-Cycle (IGCC) technology to generate electricity.24 There are currently 
                                                             
18
 Ryan M. Dailey and Donald S. Shattuck, “An Introduction to CO2 Capture and Sequestration Technology, Utility 
Engineering” (May 2008), p. 5. 
19
 Steve Blankinship, “The Evolution of Carbon Capture Technology, Part 1,” Power Engineering (March 2008), p. 30. 
20
 AEP News Release, RWE to Join AEP in Validation of Carbon Capture Technology, (November 8, 2007). 
21
 Ryan M Dailey and Donald S. Shattuck, “An Introduction to CO2 Capture and Sequestration Technology, Utility 
Engineering” (May 2008), p. 7. 
22
 Powerspan Corp., Carbon Capture Technology for Existing and New Coal-Fired Power Plants (April 15, 2008). 
23
 Powerspan Corp., Powerspan Announces CO2 Capture Technology Pilot Test Results (December 22, 2009). 
24
 IGCC is an electric generating technology in which pulverized coal is not burned directly but mixed with oxygen and 
(continued...) 
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four commercial IGCC plants worldwide (two in the United States) each with a capacity of about 
250 MW. The technology has yet to make a major breakthrough in the U.S. market because its 
potential superior environmental performance is currently not required under the Clean Air Act, 
and as discussed above for carbon capture technology, its higher costs can not be justified (see the 
Virginia State Corporation Commission decision, discussed below). 
Carbon capture in an IGCC facility would happen before combustion, under pressure using a 
physical solvent (e.g., Selexol and Rectisol processes), or a chemical solvent (e.g., methyl 
diethanolaimine (MDEA)). A simplified illustration of this process is provided in Figure 2. 
Basically, the IGCC unit pumps oxygen and a coal slurry into a gasifier to create a syngas 
consisting of carbon monoxide and hydrogen. The syngas is cleaned of conventional pollutants 
(SO2, particulates) and sent to a shift reactor which uses steam and a catalyst to produce CO2 and 
hydrogen. Because the gases are under substantial pressure with a high CO2 content, a physical 
solvent can separate out the CO2. The advantage of a physical solvent is that the CO2 can be freed 
and the solvent regenerated by reducing the pressure—a process that is substantially less energy 
intensive than having to heat the gas as in an MEA stripper. 
Figure 2. Simplified Illustration of Pre-Combustion CO2 Capture 
 
Source: Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage. Figure available at http://www.geos.ed.ac.uk/sccs/capture/
precombustion.html. 
From the capture process, the CO2 is further compressed for transportation or storage, and the 
hydrogen is directed through gas and steam cycles to produce electricity. MIT estimates the 
efficiency loss from incorporating capture technology on an IGCC facility is about 19% (from 
38.4% efficiency to 31.2%).25 This loss of efficiency comes in addition to the necessary capital 
and operations and maintenance cost of the equipment and reagents. For new construction, the 
estimated increase in electricity generating cost on a levelized basis generally ranges from 22%-
25%, with American Electric Power estimating the cost increase at 41%.26 
There is a lot of activity surrounding the further commercialization of IGCC technology and in 
the demonstration of carbon capture methods on that technology. As illustrated in Figure 3, 
numerous projects are currently in the development pipeline. The FutureGen initiative—delayed 
by DOE’s decision to restructure the program in early 2008 and subsequently revived in 2009 
                                                             
(...continued) 
water in a high-pressure gasifier to make “syngas,” a combustible fluid that is then burned in a conventional combined-
cycle arrangement to generate power. 
25
 MIT, The Future of Coal, p. 35. 
26
 MIT, The Future of Coal, p. 36. 
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with funding from P.L. 111-5—may influence how other IGCC projects develop (see box 
below).27 
Figure 3. Status of Global IGCC Projects 
 
Source: Emerging Energy Research (EER), “Global IGCC Power Markets and Strategies: 2007-2030” (December 
2007). See http://www.emerging-energy.com/. 
Combustion CO2 Capture 
Attempts to address CO2 during the combustion stage of generation focus on increasing the CO2 
concentration of the flue gas exiting the boiler. The more concentrated the CO2 is when it exits 
the boiler, the less energy (and cost) is required later to prepare it for transport or storage. The 
most developed approach involves combusting the coal with nearly pure oxygen (>95%) instead 
of air, resulting in a flue gas consisting mainly of highly concentrated CO2 and water vapor. Using 
existing technology, the oxygen would be provided by an air-separation unit—an energy-
intensive process that would be the primary source of reduced efficiency. The details of this “oxy-
fuel” process are still being refined, but generally, from the boiler the exhaust gas is cleaned of 
conventional pollutants (SO2, NOx, and particulates) and some of the gases recycled to the boiler 
to control the higher temperature resulting from coal combustion with pure oxygen. The rest of 
the gas stream is sent for further purification and compression in preparation for transport and/or 
storage.28 Depending on site-specific conditions, oxy-fuel could be retrofitted onto existing 
boilers. A simplified illustration of this process is provided in Figure 4. 
                                                             
27
 Brad Kitchens and Greg Litra, “Restructuring FutureGen,” Electric Light & Power (May/June 2008), pp. 46-47, 58. 
28
 MIT, The Future of Coal, pp. 30-31. 
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Figure 4. Simplified Illustration of Oxy-fuels CO2 Capture 
 
Source: Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage. Figure available at http://www.geos.ed.ac.uk/sccs/capture/
oxyfuel.html. 
The largest oxy-fuel demonstration projects under development are the Vattenfall Project in 
Germany and the Callide Oxyfuel Project in Queensland, Australia. The Vattenfall project is a 30 
MW pilot plant being constructed at Schwarze Pumpe, which began operation in September 
2008. The captured CO2 will be put in geological storage once siting and permitting processes are 
completed.29 The Callide Project is being sponsored by CS Energy, who, with six partners, is 
retrofitting a 30 MW boiler at its Callide-A power station with an oxy-fuel process. Operation of 
the oxy-fuel process is scheduled for 2011, with transport and geological storage of the CO2 
planned for 2011.30 
Numerous other bench- and pilot-plant scale initiatives are underway with specific work being 
conducted on improving the efficiency of the air-separation process. MIT estimates the efficiency 
losses from the installation of oxy-fuel at 23% for new construction and 31%-40% for retrofit on 
an existing plant (depending on boiler technology).31 This loss of efficiency comes in addition to 
the necessary capital and operations and maintenance cost of the equipment and reagents. For 
new construction, the increase in electricity generating cost on a levelized basis would be about 
46%. In the case of retrofit plants where the capital costs are fully amortized, the oxy-fuel capture 
process would increase generating costs on a levelized basis by about 170%-206%.32 
DOE-Supported Technology Development 
As summarized in Table 2, CO2 capture technology is currently estimated to significantly 
increase the costs of electric generation from coal-fired power plants. Research is ongoing to 
improve the economics and operation of carbon capture technology. DOE’s National Energy 
Technology Laboratory (NETL) is supporting a variety of carbon capture technology research and 
development (R&D) projects for pre-combustion, oxy-combustion, and post-combustion 
applications. A detailed description of all the NETL projects, and of carbon capture technology 
R&D efforts in the private sector, is beyond the scope of this report. However, funding from DOE 
(described later) is supporting approximately two dozen carbon capture research projects that 
range from bench-scale to pilot-scale testing.33 The types of research explored in the NETL-
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 For more information, see Vattenfall’s website at http://www.vattenfall.com/www/co2_en/co2_en/879177tbd/
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 For more information, see Callide Project website at http://www.callideoxyfuel.com/What/
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 MIT, The Future of Coal, p. 147. 
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 MIT, The Future of Coal, pp. 30, 149. 
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 Steve Blankinship, “The Evolution of Carbon Capture Technology, Part 2,” Power Engineering (May 2008), pp. 62-
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supported projects include the use of membranes, physical solvents, oxy-combustion, chemical 
sorbents, and combinations of chemical and physical solvents. According to the NETL, these 
technologies will be ready for slipstream tests by 2014 and for large-scale field testing by 2018.34 
As discussed above, some projects pursued by the private sector are ready for pilot-scale testing 
(e.g., the AEP Mountaineer project in West Virginia). 
Table 2. MIT Estimates of Additional Costs of Selected Carbon Capture Technology 
(percent increase in electric generating costs on levelized basis) 
 New Construction Retrofita 
Post-combustion (MEA) 60%-70% 220%-250% 
Pre-combustion (IGCC) 22%-25% not applicable 
Combustion (Oxy-fuel) 46% 170%-206% 
Source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (2007), pp.27, 30, 
36, 149. See text for discussion of technologies. 
a. Assumes capital costs have been fully amortized.  
Roles for Government 
Generally, studies that indicate that emerging, less carbon-intensive new technologies are both 
available and cost-effective incorporate a price mechanism (such as a carbon tax) that provides 
the necessary long-term price signal to direct research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment efforts (called “demand-pull” or “market-pull” mechanisms).35 Developing such a 
price signal involves variables such as the magnitude and nature of the market signal, and its 
timing, direction, and duration. In addition, studies indicate combining a sustained price signal 
with public support for research and development efforts is the most effective long-term strategy 
for encouraging development of new technology (called “technology-push” mechanisms).36 As 
stated by Richard D. Morgenstern: “The key to a long term research and development strategy is 
both a rising carbon price, and some form of government supported research program to 
compensate for market imperfections.”37 
The various roles the government could take in encouraging development of environmental 
technologies are illustrated in Figure 5. The federal role in the innovation process is a complex 
one, reflecting the complexity of the innovation process itself. The inventive activity reflected by 
government and private research and development efforts overlap with demand pull mechanisms 
to promote or require adoption of technology, shaping the efforts. Likewise, these initiatives are 




 DOE National Energy Technology Laboratory, Carbon Sequestration FAQ Information Portal, at 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/FAQs/tech-status.html#. 
35
 For example, see Interlaboratory Working Group, Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future, ORNL/CON-476 
(November 2000). 
36
 For example, see CERA Advisory Service, Design Issues for Market-based Greenhouse Gas Reduction Strategies; 
Special Report (February 2006), p. 59; Congressional Budget Office, Evaluating the Role of Prices and R&D in 
Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions (September 2006). 
37
 Richard D. Morgenstern, Climate Policy Instruments: The Case for the Safety Valve (Council on Foreign Relations, 
September 20-21, 2004), p. 9. 
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facilitated by the government as a forum for feedback gained through both developed and 
demonstration efforts and practical application. The process is interlinked, overlapping, and 
dynamic, rather than linear. Attempting to implement one role in a vacuum can result in mis-
directed funding or mis-timing of results. 
Figure 5. The Federal Role in R&D 
 
Source: Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin and David A Hounshell, “Control of SO2 Emissions from Power 
Plants: A Case of Induced Technological Innovation in the U.S.,” Technological Forecasting & Social Change (July 
2005), p. 699. 
This section discusses these different roles with respect to encouraging development of carbon 
capture technology, including (1) the need for a demand-pull mechanism and possible options; (2) 
current technology-push efforts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the questions they 
raise; and (3) comparison of current energy research and development efforts with past mission-
oriented efforts. 
The Need for a Demand-Pull Mechanism 
Economists note that the driving force behind the development of new and improved 
technologies is the profit motive.... However, market forces will provide insufficient 
incentives to develop climate-friendly technologies if the market prices of energy inputs do 
not fully reflect their social cost (inclusive of environmental consequences).... Even if energy 
prices reflect all production costs, without an explicit greenhouse gas policy firms have no 
incentive to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions per se beyond the motivation to 
economize on energy costs. For example, a utility would happily find a way to generate the 
same amount of electricity with less fuel, but without a policy that makes carbon dioxide 
emissions costly, it would not care specifically about the carbon content of its fuel mix in 
choosing between, say, coal and natural gas. For firms to have the desire to innovate cheaper 
and better ways to reduce emissions (and not merely inputs), they must bear additional 
financial costs for emissions.38 
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Much of the focus of debate on developing carbon capture technology has been on research, 
development, and demonstration (RD&D) needs. However, for technology to be fully 
commercialized, it must meet a market demand—a demand created either through a price 
mechanism or a regulatory requirement. As suggested by the previous discussion, any carbon 
capture technology for coal-fired power plants will increase the cost of electricity generation from 
affected plants with no increase in efficiency. Therefore, widespread commercialization of such 
technology is unlikely until it is required, either by regulation or by a carbon price. Indeed, 
regulated industries may find their regulators reluctant to accept the risks and cost of installing 
technology that is not required by legislation. This sentiment was reflected in a recent decision by 
the Virginia State Corporation Commission in denying an application by Appalachian Power 
Company (APCo) for a rate adjustment to construct an IGCC facility: 
The Company asserted that the value of this project is directly related to (1) potential future 
legal requirements for carbon capture and sequestration; and (2) the proposed IGCC Plant’s 
potential ability to comply cost effectively with any such requirements. Both of these factors, 
however, are unknown at this time and do not overcome the other infirmities in the 
Application. The legal necessity of, and the capability of, cost-effective carbon capture and 
sequestration in this particular IGCC Plant, at this time, has not been sufficiently established 
to render APCo’s Application reasonable or prudent under the Virginia Statute we must 
follow.39 
At the same time, there is reluctance to invest in technology that is not required, and the 
unresolved nature of greenhouse gas regulation is affecting investment in any coal-fired 
generation.40 The risk involved in investing in coal-fired generation absent anticipated greenhouse 
gas regulations is outlined in “The Carbon Principles” announced by three Wall Street banks—
Citi, JP Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley—in February 2008. As stated in their paper: 
The absence of comprehensive federal action on climate change creates unknown financial 
risks for those building and financing new fossil fuel generation resources. The Financial 
Institutions that have signed the Principles recognize that federal CO2 control legislation is 
being considered and is likely to be adopted during the service life of many new power 
plants. It is prudent to take concrete actions today that help developers, investors and 
financiers to identify, analyze, reduce and mitigate climate risks.41 
Similarly, lack of a regulatory scheme presents numerous risks to any RD&D effort designed to 
develop carbon capture technology. Unlike a mission-oriented research effort, like the Manhattan 
Project to develop an atomic bomb, where the ultimate goal is victory and the cost virtually 
irrelevant, research efforts focused on developing a commercial device need to know what the 
market wants in a product and how much the product is worth. At the current time, the market 
value of a carbon capture device is zero in much of the country because there is no market for 
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 State Corporation Commission, Application of Appalachian Power Company, Case No. PUE-2007-00068 
(Richmond, April 14, 2008), p. 16. 
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 As stated by DOE: “Regulatory uncertainty for GHG legislation is a key issue impacting technology selection and 
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carbon emissions or regulations requiring their reduction.42 All estimates of value are 
hypothetical—dependent on a reduction program or regulatory regime that doesn’t exist. With no 
market or regulatory signals determining appropriate performance standards and cost-
effectiveness criteria, investment in carbon capture technology is a risky business that could 
easily result in the development of a “white elephant” or “gold-plated” technology that doesn’t 
meet market demand. 
While the “threat” of a carbon regime is stimulating RD&D efforts and influencing decisions 
about future energy (particularly electricity) supply, the current spread of greenhouse gas control 
regimes being proposed doesn’t provide much guidance in suggesting appropriate performance 
and cost-effectiveness benchmarks for a solution with respect to coal-fired generation. For 
example, isolating just one variable in the future price of carbon under a cap-and-trade program—
tonnage reduction requirement—the future value of carbon reductions can vary substantially.43 As 
illustrated by Figure 6, three possible reduction targets in 2050—maintaining current 2008 levels 
(287 billion metric tons [bmt]), reducing emissions to 50% of 1990 levels (203 bmt), and 
reducing emissions to 20% of 1990 levels (167 bmt)—result in substantially different price tracks 
for CO2.44 Without a firm idea of the tonnage goal and reduction schedule, any deployment or 
commercialization strategy would be a high-risk venture, as suggested by the previously noted 
Virginia State Corporation Commission conclusion. 
Figure 6. CO2 Price Projections 
 
Source: Segey Paltsev, et al., Assessment of U.S. Cap-and-Trade Proposals, MIT Joint Program on the Science and 
Policy of Global Change, Report 146 (April 2007), p. 16. For details on the analysis presented here, consult the 
report. Available at http://mit.edu/globalchange. 
Note: CO2e = carbon dioxide equivalent 
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Approaches to a Demand-Pull Mechanism 
There are two basic approaches to a demand-pull mechanism: (1) a regulatory requirement, and 
(2) a price signal via a market-based CO2 reduction program. These approaches are not mutually 
exclusive and can serve different goals. For example, a regulation focused on new construction 
(such as the New Source Performance Standard under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act45) could 
be used to phase in deployment of carbon capture technology and prevent more coal-fired 
facilities from being constructed without carbon capture (or ensure they would be at least “ready” 
for carbon capture later). At the same time, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program could be 
initiated to begin sending a market signal to companies that further controls will be necessary in 
the future if they decide to continue operating coal-fired facilities. 
Creating Demand Through a Regulatory Requirement: An Example 
from the SO2 New Source Performance Standards 
It is an understatement to say that the new source performance standards promulgated by the 
EPA were technology-forcing. Electric utilities went from having no scrubbers on their 
generating units to incorporating very complex chemical processes. Chemical plants and 
refineries had scrubbing systems that were a few feet in diameter, but not the 30- to 40-foot 
diameters required by the utility industry. Utilities had dealt with hot flue gases, but not with 
saturated flue gases that contained all sorts of contaminants. Industry, and the US EPA, has 
always looked upon new source performance standards as technology-forcing, because they 
force the development of new technologies in order to satisfy emissions requirements.46 
The most direct method to encourage adoption of carbon capture technology would be to mandate 
it. Mandating a performance standard on coal-fired power plants is not a new idea; indeed, 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop 
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for any new and modified power plant (and other 
stationary sources) that in the Administrator’s judgment “causes, or contributes significantly to, 
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public heath or welfare.” NSPS 
can be issued for pollutants for which there is no National Ambient Air Quality Standard 
(NAAQS), like carbon dioxide.47 In addition, NSPS is the floor for other stationary source 
standards such as Best Available Control Technology (BACT) determinations for Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) areas and Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) 
determinations for non-attainment areas.48 
The process of forcing the development of emission controls on coal-fired power plants is 
illustrated by the 1971 and 1978 SO2 NSPS for coal-fired electric generating plants. The Clean 
Air Act states that NSPS should reflect “the degree of emission limitation achievable through the 
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application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of 
achieving such reductions and any non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.”49 In 
promulgating its first utility SO2 NSPS in 1971, EPA determined that a 1.2 pound of SO2 per 
million Btu of heat input performance standard met the criteria of Sec. 111—a standard that 
required, on average, a 70% reduction in new power plant emissions, and could be met by low-
sulfur coal that was available in both the eastern and western parts of the United States, or by the 
use of emerging flue gas desulfurization (FGD) devices.50 
At the time the 1971 Utility SO2 NSPS was promulgated, there was only one FGD vendor 
(Combustion Engineering) and only three commercial FGD units in operation—one of which 
would be retired by the end of the year.51 This number would increase rapidly, not only because of 
the NSPS, but also because of the promulgation of the SO2 NAAQS, the 1973 Supreme Court 
decision preventing significant deterioration of pristine areas,52 and state requirements for 
stringent SO2 controls, which opened up a market for retrofits of existing coal-fired facilities in 
addition to the NSPS focus on new facilities. Indeed, most of the growth in FGD installations 
during the early and mid-1970s was in retrofits—Taylor estimates that between 1973 and 1976, 
72% of the FGD market was in retrofits.53 By 1977, there were 14 vendors offering full-scale 
commercial FGD installation.54 
Despite this growth, only 10% of the new coal-fired facilities constructed between 1973 and 1976 
had FGD installations. In addition, the early performance of these devices was not brilliant.55 In 
1974, American Electric Power (AEP) spearheaded an ad campaign to have EPA reject FGD 
devices as “too unreliable, too impractical for electric utility use” in favor of tall stacks, 
supplementary controls, and low-sulfur western coal.56 This effort was ultimately unsuccessful as 
the Congress chose to modify the NSPS requirements for coal-fired electric generators in 1977 by 
adding a “percentage reduction” requirement. As promulgated in 1979, the revised SO2 NSPS 
retained the 1971 performance standard but added a requirement for a 70%-90% reduction in 
emissions, depending on the sulfur content of the coal.57 At the time, this requirement could be 
met only through use of an FGD device. The effect of the “scrubber requirement” is clear from 
the data provided in Figure 7. Based on their analysis of FGD development, Taylor, Rubin, and 
Hounshell state the importance of demand-pull instruments: 
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Figure 7. Number of FGD Units and Cumulative GW Capacity of FGD Units: 
1973-1996 
 
Source: Adapted by Taylor from Soud (1994). See Margaret R. Taylor, op. cit., 74. 
Note: Numbers are archival through June 1994, then projected for 1994-96. 
Results indicate that: regulation and the anticipation of regulation stimulate invention; 
technology-push instruments appear to be less effective at prompting invention than demand-
pull instruments; and regulatory stringency focuses inventive activity along certain 
technology pathways.58 
That government policy could force the development of a technology through creating a market 
should not suggest that the government was limited to that role, or that the process was smooth or 
seamless. On the latter point, Shattuck, et al., summarize the early years of FGD development as 
follows: 
The Standards of Performance for New Sources are technology-forcing, and for the utility 
industry they forced the development of a technology that had never been installed on 
facilities the size of utility plants. That technology had to be developed, and a number of 
installations completed in a short period of time. The US EPA continued to force technology 
through the promulgation of successive regulations. The development of the equipment was 
not an easy process. What may have appeared to be the simple application of an equipment 
item from one industry to another often turned out to be fraught with unforeseen 
challenges.59 
The example indicates that technology-forcing regulations can be effective in pulling technology 
into the market—even when there remains some operational difficulties for that technology. The 
difference for carbon capture technology is that for long-term widespread development, a new 
infrastructure of pipelines and storage sites may be necessary in addition to effective carbon 
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capture technology. In the short-term, suitable alternatives, such as enhanced oil recovery needs 
and in-situ geologic storage, may be available to support early commercialization projects 
without the need for an integrated transport and storage system. Likewise, with economics more 
favorable for new facilities than for retrofits, concentrating on using new construction to 
introduce carbon capture technology might be one path to widespread commercialization. As an 
entry point to carbon capture deployment, a regulatory approach such as NSPS may represent a 
first step, as suggested by the SO2 NSPS example above. 
Creating Demand Through a Price Signal: Carbon Taxes, 
Allowance Pricing, and Auctions 
Much of the current discussion of developing a market-pull mechanism for new carbon capture 
technology has focused on creating a price for carbon emissions. The literature suggests that this 
is an important component for developing new technology, perhaps more important even than 
research and development. As stated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO): 
Analyses that consider the costs and benefits of both carbon pricing and R&D all come to the 
same qualitative conclusion: near-term pricing of carbon emissions is an element of a cost-
effective policy approach. That result holds even though studies make different assumptions 
about the availability of alternative energy technologies, the amount of crowding out caused 
by federal subsidies, and the form of the policy target (maximizing net benefits versus 
minimizing the cost of reaching a target).60 
Two basic approaches can be employed in the case of a market-based greenhouse gas control 
program: a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program. The carbon tax would create a long-term 
price signal to stimulate innovation and development of new technology. This price signal could 
be strengthened if the carbon tax were escalated over the long run—either by a statutorily 
determined percentage or by an index (such as the producer price index). A carbon tax’s basic 
approach to controlling greenhouse gas emissions is to supply the marketplace with a stable, 
consistent price signal—a signal that would also inform innovators as to the cost performance 
targets they should seek in developing alternative technologies. Designed appropriately, there 
would be little danger of the price spikes or market volatility that can occur in the early stages of 
a tradeable permit program.61 
A cap-and-trade program creates a price signal for new technology through a market price for 
carbon permits (called allowances)—an allowance is a limited authorization to emit one metric 
ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). In a cap-and-trade system, these allowances are issued 
by the government and either allocated or auctioned to affected companies who may use them to 
comply with the cap, sell them to other companies on the market, or bank them for future use or 
sale. The resulting market transactions result in an allowance price. This price on carbon 
emissions, however, can be both uncertain and volatile.62 In addition, a low allowance price may 
be insufficient to encourage technology development and refinement. For example, the 1990 acid 
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rain control program effectively ended the development of FGD for retrofit purposes by setting an 
emission cap that resulted in low allowance prices and that could be met through the use of low-
sulfur coal. Noting that only 10% of phase 1 facilities chose FGD to comply with its 
requirements, Taylor, et al., state: 
The 1990 CAAA, however, although initially predicted to increase demand for FGD 
systems, eroded the market potential for both dry and wet FGD system applications at 
existing power plants when the SO2 allowance trading market returned low-sulfur coal to its 
importance in SO2 control.... As a result, research in dry FGD technology declined 
significantly. In this case, the flexibility provided by the 1990 acid rain regulations 
discouraged inventive activity in technologies that might have had broader markets under the 
traditional command-and-control regimes in place prior to 1990.63 [footnotes from original 
text omitted] 
A cap-and-trade program need not have such a result. For example, to more effectively promote 
carbon capture technology, the price signal under a greenhouse gas reduction program could be 
strengthened by requiring the periodic auctioning of a substantial portion of available allowances 
rather than giving them away at no cost. The SO2 program allocated virtually all of its allowance 
at no cost to affected companies. Auctioning a substantial portion of available allowances could 
create a powerful price signal and provide incentives for deploying new technology if structured 
properly.64 The program could create a price floor to facilitate investment in new technology via a 
reserve price in the allowance auction process. In addition, the stability of that price signal could 
be strengthened by choosing to auction allowances on a frequent basis, ensuring availability of 
allowances close to the time of expected demand and making any potential short-squeezing of the 
secondary market more difficult.65 
One positive aspect of the acid rain cap-and-trade experience for encouraging deployment of 
technology was the effectiveness of “bonus” allowances and deadline extensions as incentives to 
install FGD. Specifically, about 3.5 million of the allowances were earmarked for Phase 1 power 
plants choosing to install 90% control technology (such as FGD). Such units were allowed to 
delay Phase 1 compliance from 1995 to 1997 and receive two allowances for each ton of S02 
reduced below a 1.2 lb. per mmBtu level during 1997-1999. The 3.5 million allowance reserve 
was fully subscribed, and was a major factor in what FGD was installed during Phase 1 of the 
program. This experience may bode well for proposed CCS “bonus allowance” provisions in 
several greenhouse gas reduction schemes currently introduced in the Congress.66 
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Current Technology-Push Mechanisms: DOE 
Investment in CCS R&D 
The Department of Energy (DOE) is engaged in a variety of activities to push development and 
demonstration of carbon capture technologies. These activities include direct spending on 
research and development, and providing loan guarantees and tax credits to promote carbon 
capture projects. These technology-push incentives, and the issues they raise, are discussed 
below. 
Direct Spending on R&D 
The federal government has recognized the potential need for carbon capture technology—as part 
of broader efforts to address greenhouse-gas induced climate change—since at least 1997, when 
DOE spent approximately $1 million for the entire CCS program.67 Table 3 shows that DOE 
programs that provide funding for CCS-related activities totaled nearly $575 million for FY2009, 
a significant increase since 1997.68 Funding for CCS R&D increased by nearly 58% from FY2008 
to FY2009. Table 3 also shows that funding appears to have decreased for CCS R&D in FY2010 
as compared to FY2009, and the request for FY2011 is slightly lower than the FY2010 amounts. 
However, funding from P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA, shown in the last column of the table), increases overall spending for CCS dramatically 
compared to previous years. 
DOE indicated in its FY2011 budget request that its Office of Fossil Energy will propose a new 
budget structure for FY2012 to reflect the increased focus on CCS technologies within the DOE 
Clean Coal program. The FY2011 budget request further stated that research, development, and 
deployment of CCS is a major component of global activities needed if coal power plants with 
CCS are to be deployed “in a timeframe consistent with climate stabilization goals.”69 DOE 
indicated that these activities may lead to mass commercial deployment of CCS by 2020.70 
Table 3. Funding for CCS-Related Activities at DOE 
($ thousands) 
 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010  
FY2011 
request ARRA 
Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI)a  67,444 288,174 0 0 800,000 
FutureGenb 72,262 0 0 0 1,000,000 
Innovation for Existing Plants (IEP)c 35,083 48,600 52,000 65,000 — 
Advanced Integrated Gasification Combined Cycled 52,029 63,409 63,000 55,000 — 
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 Personal communication, Timothy E. Fout, General Engineer, DOE National Energy Technology Laboratory, 
Morgantown, WV (July 16, 2008). 
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 Funding for FY2009 is according to U.S. Department of Energy, FY2011 Congressional Budget Request, volume 3, 
Fossil Energy Research and Development, at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/11budget/Content/Volume%203.pdf. 
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 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010  
FY2011 
request ARRA 
Advanced Turbinese 23,125 27,216 32,000 31,000 — 
Industrial Carbon Capture Projects — —   1,520,000 
Site Characterization, Training, Program Direction — —   80,000 
Subtotal 249,943 427,399 147,000 151,000 3,400,000 
Carbon Sequestration Greenhouse Gas Control 105,985 132,192 140,000 133,000 — 
Carbon Sequestration Energy Innovation Hub 0 0 0  — 
Carbon Sequestration Focus Area for 
Carbon Sequestration Science 
9,635 13,608 14,000 10,000 — 
Subtotal for Carbon Sequestration 115,620 145,800 154,000 143,000 — 
Total 365,563 573,199 301,000 294,000 3,400,000 
Source: CRS, from the U.S. Department of Energy, FY2011 Congressional Budget Request, volume 3, Fossil Energy 
Research and Development, at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/11budget/Content/Volume%203.pdf; and U.S. 
Department of Energy, FY2010 Congressional Budget Request, volume 7, Fossil Energy Research and Development, 
at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/10budget/Content/Volumes/Volume7.pdf. 
Notes: Overall FY2010 Fossil Energy Research appropriations are included in CRS Report R40669, Energy and 
Water Development: FY2010 Appropriations. 
a. The FY2011 budget request does not include any funds for CCPI demonstration projects because $800 
million is already provided by ARRA (P.L. 111-5) for Phase III of the CCPI program.  
b. Language in ARRA indicated that $1 billion would be allocated for Fossil Energy R&D. On June 12, 2009, 
Secretary Chu announced that the funds would be used to support FutureGen.  
c. In its FY2011 budget request, DOE indicates that all the IEP activity is focused on the development of post-
combustion CO2 capture technology for new and existing plants.  
d. According to DOE, the IGCC activity is focused on developing advanced gasification-based technologies to 
reduce the costs of near-zero emissions (including CO2) coal-based IGCC plants. The program is also 
intended to improve the thermal efficiency of the plants, and to achieve near-zero atmospheric emissions 
for all pollutants, including CO2, SO2, NOx, and mercury.  
e. The Advanced Turbines program is focused on creating the technology base for turbines that will permit 
the design of near-zero atmospheric emission IGCC plants (including CO2).  
Carbon Capture and Sequestration in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
Funding for carbon capture and sequestration technology has increased substantially as a result of 
enactment of ARRA (P.L. 111-5). In the compromise legislation considered in conference on 
February 11, 2009, the conferees agreed to provide $3.4 billion through FY2010 for fossil energy 
research and development within the Department of Energy (DOE). Of that amount, $1.52 billion 
would be made available for a competitive solicitation for industrial carbon capture and energy 
efficiency improvement projects, according to the explanatory statement accompanying the 
legislation. This provision likely refers to a program for large scale demonstration projects that 
capture CO2 from a range of industrial sources. A small portion of the $1.52 billion would be 
allocated for developing innovative concepts for reusing CO2, according to the explanatory 
statement. Of the remaining $1.88 billion, $1 billion would be available for fossil energy research 
and development programs. The explanatory statement did not specify which program or 
programs would receive funding, however, or how the $1 billion would be allocated. However, on 
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June 12, 2009, Energy Secretary Chu announced that the $1 billion would be used to support a 
renewed FutureGen facility in Mattoon, IL. Of the remaining $880 million, the conferees agreed 
to allocate $800 million to the DOE Clean Coal Power Initiative Round III solicitations, which 
specifically target coal-based systems that capture and sequester, or reuse, CO2 emissions. Lastly, 
$50 million would be allocated for site characterization activities in geologic formations (for the 
storage component of CCS activities), $20 million for geologic sequestration training and 
research, and $10 million for unspecified program activities. 
With the announcement that $1 billion of the ARRA funds would be used to restart FutureGen, 
nearly all of the $3.4 billion agreed to by conferees will be used for CCS activities, which 
represents a substantial infusion of funding compared to current spending levels. This also 
amounts to a large and rapid increase in funding over what DOE has spent on CCS cumulatively 
since FY1997.71 Moreover, the bulk of DOE’s CCS program will shift to the capture component 
of CCS, unless funding for the storage component increases commensurately in annual 
appropriations. The large and rapid increase in funding, compared to the magnitude and pace of 
previous CCS spending, may raise questions about the efficacy of a “crash” CCS program as part 
of a long-term strategy to reduce CO2 emissions. This issue is discussed further below. 
Loan Guarantees and Tax Credits 
Appropriations represent one mechanism for funding carbon capture technology R&D and 
deployment; others include loan guarantees and tax credits, both of which are available under 
current law.  
Loan Guarantees 
Loan guarantee incentives that could be applied to CCS were authorized under Title XVII of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct2005, P.L. 109-58, 42 U.S.C. §§16511-16514), and were given 
indefinite authorization under the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). Title XVII of 
EPAct2005 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to make loan guarantees for projects that, among 
other purposes, avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases. The Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY2009 restates the loan guarantee 
authority and provides $6 billion in loan guarantees for coal-based power generation and 
industrial gasification activities at retrofitted and new facilities that incorporate CCS or other 
beneficial uses of carbon. The act provides an additional $2 billion in loan guarantees for 
advanced coal gasification.72 
Tax Credits 
Title XIII of EPAct2005 provided for tax credits that could be used for Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) projects and for projects that use other advanced coal-based generation 
technologies (ACBGT). For these types of projects, the aggregate credits available under 
EPAct2005 totaled up to $1.3 billion: $800 million for IGCC projects, and $500 million for 
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 Approximately $1.4 billion through FY2009 (CRS estimate). 
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 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Division C—Energy and 
Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2009, committee print, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 
2009, p. 672. 
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ACBGT projects. Qualifying projects under Title XIII of EPAct2005 were not limited to 
technologies that employ carbon capture technologies, but the Secretary of the Treasury was 
directed to give high priority to projects that include greenhouse gas capture capability. An 
additional $350 million of tax credits were made available for coal gasification projects. 
Sections 111 and 112 of P.L. 110-343, Division B, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 
2008 (part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008), increased the aggregate tax 
credits available from $1.65 billion to $3.15 billion. Section 111 added an additional $1.25 billion 
to the existing tax credit authority for ACBGT projects. Section 112 added an additional $250 
million to $350 million in existing authority for the coal gasification investment credit, for 
gasification projects that separate and sequester at least 75% of the project’s total CO2 emissions. 
Section 115 of the act added a new tax credit for sequestering CO2 and storing it underground. 
The section provides for a credit of $20 per metric ton of CO2 captured at a qualified facility and 
disposed of in secure geological storage, and $10 per metric ton if the CO2 is used as a tertiary 
injectant for the purposes of enhanced oil or natural gas recovery. To qualify for the tax credit, the 
facility must capture at least 500,000 metric tons of CO2 per year. If CO2 is used for enhanced oil 
or gas recovery, a tax credit would be available only for an initial injection; CO2 subsequently 
recaptured, recycled, and re-injected would not be eligible for a tax credit. 
Encouraging Technology Development in the 
Absence of a Market: Issues for Current Carbon 
Capture RD&D Policy 
Each of the funding mechanisms described above—appropriations, loan guarantees, and tax 
credits—are examples of government “pushing” carbon capture technologies (the upper left 
arrow in Figure 5) via direct spending and through private sector incentives. Thus far, however, 
these activities are taking place in a vacuum with respect to a carbon market or a regulatory 
structure. Lacking a price signal or regulatory mandate, it is difficult to assess whether a 
government-push approach is sufficient for long-term technology development.73 Some studies 
appear to discount the necessity of a price signal or regulatory mandate, at least initially, and 
place a higher priority on the successful demonstration of large-scale technological, economic, 
and environmental performance of technologies that comprise all of the components of an 
integrated CCS system: capture, transportation, and storage.74 So far, however, the only federally 
sponsored, fully integrated, large-scale CCS demonstration project—called FutureGen (see box 
below)—failed in its original conception, which may have been due, in part, to the lack of a 
perceived market. 
DOE announced it was restructuring the FutureGen program because of its rising costs, which are 
difficult to assess against the project’s “benefits” without a monetary value attached to those 
benefits (i.e., the value of carbon extracted from the fuel and permanently sequestered). A carbon 
market would at least provide some way of comparing costs against benefits. One could argue 
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market imperfections. In the current situation, there is no market, and thus its imperfections are moot. 
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 MIT, The Future of Coal, p. xi. 
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that the benefits of CCS accrue to the amelioration of future costs of environmental degradation 
caused by greenhouse gas-induced global warming. Although it may be possible to identify 
overall environmental benefits to removing CO2 that would otherwise be released to the 
atmosphere, assigning a monetary value to those benefits to compare against costs is extremely 
difficult. 
Trying to Pick a Winner: FutureGen 
On February 27, 2003, President Bush proposed a 10-year, $1 billion project to build a coal-fired power plant that 
integrates carbon sequestration and hydrogen production while generating 275 megawatts of electricity, enough to 
power about 150,000 average U.S. homes. As originally conceived, the plant would have been a coal-gasification 
facility and would have produced between 1 and 2 million metric tons of CO2 annually. The plant was envisioned to 
be nearly emissions-free because most of the CO2 produced would be captured and sequestered underground. On 
January 30, 2008, DOE announced that it was “restructuring” the FutureGen program away from a single, state-of-
the-art “living laboratory” of integrated R&D technologies—a single plant—to instead pursue a new strategy of 
providing funding for the addition of CCS technology to multiple commercial-scale Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle (IGCC) power plants. In the restructured program, DOE would support up to two or three demonstration 
projects, each of at least 300 MW, and that would sequester at least 1 million metric tons of CO2 per year. In its 
budget justification for FY2009, DOE cited “new market realities” for its decision, namely rising material and labor 
costs for new power plants and the need to demonstrate commercial viability of IGCC plants with CCS. A policy 
question that emerged following the DOE’s decision to scrap the original FutureGen concept was whether such a 
concept can be viable without a long-term price signal for carbon. FutureGen supporters have indicated that the rise 
in FutureGen’s projected costs were consistent with the rise in global energy infrastructure projects due to inflation, 
implying that rising costs are not unique to FutureGen. Nevertheless, the reasons given by DOE in its decision to 
cancel the original concept are prima facie evidence that lack of a price signal for carbon in the face of known and 
rising costs for plant construction created too much uncertainty for the agency to continue the project. It is unclear 
whether a long-term price signal would have supported the FutureGen concept anyway, given the project’s other 
uncertainties, such as its choice of a capture technology and disagreements over the private cost-share agreement. 
With the passage of ARRA, however, FutureGen was revived. On June 12, 2009, Secretary Chu announced that the 
$1 billion of funding from ARRA will be used to support FutureGen, and that the plant will be built in Mattoon, IL, the 
site selected by the FutureGen Alliance in 2007. According to DOE, its total anticipated contribution to FutureGen 
will be $1.073 billion, and the FutureGen Alliance will contribute between $400 and $600 million to the project. On 
July 14, 2009, DOE issued a National Environmental Policy Act record of decision to move forward on FutureGen. 
Some reports indicate that the newly revived plans for FutureGen call for an initial carbon capture goal of 60% for the 
facility, with the ultimate goal of achieving a 90% capture rate—the target set in the project’s original conception. 
Some environmental groups have expressed views that the lower capture rate may put FutureGen in the same 
category as other CCS commercialization projects, calling into question the status of FutureGen as a “flagship facility 
to demonstrate carbon capture and storage at commercial scale.” 
Sources: DOE, http://www.fossil.energy.gov/news/techlines/2008/08003-
DOE_Announces_Restructured_FutureG.htm; DOE FY2009 Budget request, p. 16; FutureGen Alliance press release 
(April 15, 2008), http://www.futuregenalliance.org/news/releases/pr_04-15-08.stm; Ben Geman, “Enviros Fault Scaled-
Back FutureGen Carbon Goal,” Greenwire, June 16, 2009; Secretary Chu’s announcement on FutureGen at 
http://www.energy.gov/news2009/7454.htm; Michael T. Burr, “Death of a Turkey, DOE’s Move to ‘Restructure’ 
FutureGen Clears the Way for a More Rational R&D,” Public Utilities Fortnightly (March 2008); and David Goldston, 
“Demonstrably Wrong,” Nature, vol. 453, no. 16 (April 30, 2008), p. 16. 
What Should the Federal Government Spend on CCS Technology 
Development? 
As discussed above, several studies underscore the value of a long-term price or regulatory signal 
to shape technological development and, presumably, to help determine a level of federal 
investment needed to encourage commercialization of an environmental technology such as 
carbon capture. As stated by Fischer: 
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With respect to R&D for specific applications (such as particular manufacturing technologies 
or electricity generation), governments are notoriously bad at picking winners... [e.g., the 
breeder reactor]. The selection of these projects is best left to private markets while the 
government ensures those markets face the socially correct price signals.75 
Despite the lack of regulatory incentives or price signals, DOE has invested millions of dollars 
since 1997 into capture technology R&D, and the question remains whether it has been too much, 
too little, or about the right amount. In addition to appropriating funds each year for the DOE 
program, Congress signaled its support for RD&D investment for CCS through provisions for tax 
credits available for carbon capture technology projects and through loan guarantees. Congress 
also authorized a significant expansion of CCS spending at DOE in the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140), which would authorize appropriations for a total of 
$2.2 billion from FY2008 through FY2013. Although EISA places an increased emphasis on 
large-scale underground injection and storage experiments, the legislation authorizes $200 million 
per year for projects that demonstrate technologies for the large-scale capture of CO2 from a 
range of industrial sources. Lastly, ARRA provides a dramatic infusion of funding for CCS 
RD&D over the next several years. 
Legislation in the 110th and 111th Congresses 
Legislation introduced in the 110th Congress would have authorized specific amounts of spending 
for CCS and capture technology development. Notably, the Carbon Capture and Storage Early 
Deployment Act (H.R. 6258) would have authorized distribution utilities76 to collect an 
assessment on fossil-fuel based electricity delivered to retail customers. The assessment would 
total approximately $1 billion annually, and would be issued by a corporation—established by 
referendum among the distribution utilities—as grants or contracts to private, academic, or 
government entities to accelerate commercial demonstration or availability of CO2 capture and 
storage technologies and methods. This legislation contained elements that resembled, in many 
respects, recommendations offered in the MIT report.77 Hearings were held, but the measure was 
not reported out of committee. 
Other bills introduced in the 110th Congress included incentives such as tax credits, debt 
financing, and regulations to promote CO2 capture technology development. For example, S. 
3132, the Accelerating Carbon Capture and Sequestration Act of 2008, would have provided a tax 
credit of $20 per metric ton of CO2 captured and stored.78 S. 3233, the 21st Century Energy 
Technology Deployment Act, would have established a corporation that could issue debt 
instruments (such as bonds) for financing technology development. A priority cited in S. 3233 
was the deployment of commercial-scale CO2 capture and storage technology that could capture 
10 million short tons of CO2 per year by 2015. A bill aimed at increasing the U.S. production of 
oil and natural gas while minimizing CO2 emissions, the American Energy Production Act of 
2008 (S. 2973), called for the promulgation of regulations for clean, coal-derived fuels. Facilities 
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 A distribution utility is defined in the legislation as an electric utility that has a legal, regulatory, or contractual 
obligation to deliver electricity directly to retail customers. 
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 MIT, The Future of Coal, p. 102. 
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enhanced oil and natural gas recovery project. 
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that process or refine such fuels would be required to capture 100% of the CO2 that would 
otherwise be released at the facility. None of the bills were enacted into law. 
In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, and S. 
1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, are the two primary energy and climate 
change legislative proposals. H.R. 2454 passed the House on June 26, 2009, and S. 1733 was 
ordered to be reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on November 5, 
2009. The CCS provisions in both bills are similar (some sections are identical), and both bills 
appear to share the goal of fostering the commercial development and deployment of CCS 
projects as an important component of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. Both bills contain 
similar provisions that would create a program to accelerate the commercial availability of CO2 
capture and storage technologies and methods by awarding grants, contracts, and financial 
assistance to electric utilities, academic institutions, and other eligible entities (similar to H.R. 
6258 of the 110th Congress, discussed above). Both bills would also create a second program that 
would distribute emission allowances from the cap-and-trade provisions to qualifying electric 
generating plants and industrial facilities.79 
One bill introduced in the 111th Congress, the New Manhattan Project for Energy Independence 
(H.R. 513), calls for a system of grants and prizes for RD&D on the scale of the original 
Manhattan project, with a goal of attaining energy independence for the nation. Other legislation 
introduced in the 110th Congress invoked the symbolism of the Apollo program of the 1960s to 
frame proposals for large-scale energy policy initiatives that include developing CCS 
technology.80 The relevance and utility of large-scale government projects, such as the Apollo 
program, or the Manhattan project, to developing carbon capture technology are explored in the 
following sections. 
Should the Federal Government Embark on a “Crash” Research 
and Development Program? 
Some policymakers have proposed that the United States invest in energy research, development, 
and demonstration activities at the same level of commitment as it invested in the past during the 
Manhattan project and the Apollo program.81 As analogues to the development of technologies to 
reduce CO2 emissions and thwart long-term climate change, the Manhattan project and Apollo 
program are imperfect at best. They both had short-term goals, their success or failure was easily 
measured, and perhaps most importantly, they did not depend on the successful 
commercialization of technology and its adoption by the private sector. Nevertheless, both 
projects provide a funding history for comparison against CO2 capture technology cost 
projections, and as examples of large government-led projects initiated to achieve a national goal. 
The Manhattan project and Apollo program are discussed briefly below. 
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 For a comparison between both bills, see CRS Report R40867, Carbon Capture and Sequestration in H.R. 2454 and 
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 For example, H.R. 2809, the New Apollo Energy Act of 2007; and H.R. 6385, the Apollo Energy Independence Act 
of 2008.  
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 For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL34645, The Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and 
Federal Energy Technology R&D Programs: A Comparative Analysis, by Deborah D. Stine. 
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The federal government’s efforts to promote energy technology development in response to the 
energy crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s may be a richer analogy to CO2 capture technology 
development than either the Manhattan project or Apollo program. After the first oil crisis in 
1973, and with the second oil crisis in the late 1970s, the national priority was to reduce 
dependence on foreign supplies of energy, particularly crude oil, through a combination of new 
domestic supplies (e.g., oil shale), energy efficiency technologies, and alternative energy supplies 
such as solar, among others. The success of these efforts was to have been determined, in part, by 
the commercialization of energy technologies and alternative energy supplies and their 
incorporation into American society over the long term. Similarly, many analysts see the 
development of CCS technology as a necessary step needed over the next several decades or half-
century to help alleviate human-induced climate change, which is itself viewed as a global 
problem for at least the next century or longer. As discussed more fully later, the outcome of the 
federal government’s efforts to promote energy technologies in the 1970s and 1980s may be 
instructive to current approaches to develop CCS technology. 
The Manhattan Project and Apollo Program 
The Manhattan project took place from 1942 to 1946.82 In July 1945, a bomb was successfully 
tested in New Mexico, and used against Japan at two locations in August 1945. In 1946, the 
civilian Atomic Energy Commission was established to manage the nation’s future atomic 
activities, and the Manhattan project officially ended. According to one estimate, the Manhattan 
project cost $2.2 billion from 1942-1946 ($22 billion in 2008 dollars), greater than the original 
cost and time estimate of approximately $148 million for 1942 to 1944.83 
The Apollo program encompassed 17 missions including six lunar landings that took place from 
FY1960 to FY1973.84 Although preliminary discussions regarding the Apollo program began in 
1960, Congress did not decide to fund it until 1961 after the Soviets became the first country to 
send a human into space. The peak cost for the Apollo program occurred in FY1966 when 
NASA’s total budget was $4.5 billion and its funding for Apollo was $3.0 billion.85 According to 
NASA, the total cost of the Apollo program for FY1960-FY1973 was $19.4 billion ($97.9 billion 
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NASA, The Apollo Spacecraft - A Chronology, NASA Special Publication-4009, at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/
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in 2008 dollars).86 The first lunar landing took place in July 1969. The last occurred in December 
1972. Figure 8 shows the funding history for both the Manhattan project and Apollo program. 
Figure 8. Annual Funding for the Manhattan Project, Apollo Program, and 

















DOE Energy Technology Programs (FY1974-FY2008)
 
Source: Congressional Research Service. Manhattan Project data: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, 
Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: The New World, 1939/1946, Volume I. Apollo program 
data: Richard Orloff, Apollo By The Numbers: A Statistical Reference, NASA SP-2000-4029, 2004 web update. DOE 
data: CRS Report RS22858, Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, 
Fossil Energy, and Energy Efficiency R&D, by Fred Sissine. 
DOE-Supported Energy Technology Development 
The Department of Energy has its origins in the Manhattan project,87 and became a Cabinet-level 
department in 1977,88 partly in response to the first oil crisis of 1973, caused in part by the Arab 
oil embargo. Another oil crisis (the “second” oil crisis) took place from 1978-1981 as a result of 
political revolution in Iran. Funding for DOE energy R&D rose in the 1970s in concert with high 
oil prices and resultant Carter Administration priorities on conservation and development of 
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alternative energy supplies. Crude oil prices fell during the 1980s and the Reagan Administration 
eliminated many energy R&D programs that began during the oil crisis years. Figure 8 shows the 
rise and fall of funding for DOE energy technology programs from 1974 to 2008. 
Comparisons to CO2 Capture R&D at DOE 
Current DOE spending on CCS technology development (discussed above) is far below levels of 
funding for the Manhattan project and Apollo program and for the energy technology R&D 
programs at their peak spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The development of CO2 
capture technology is, of course, only one component of all federal spending on global climate 
change mitigation. However, the total annual federal expenditures on climate change, including 
basic research, are still far less than the Manhattan project and Apollo program, although similar 
to DOE energy technology development programs during their peak spending period.89 For 
comparison, the FY2008 budget and FY2009 budget request for DOE’s energy technology R&D 
is approximately $3 billion per year. (See Figure 8.) 
Even if spending on CO2 capture technology were increased dramatically to Manhattan project or 
Apollo program levels, it is not clear whether the goal of developing a commercially deployable 
technology would be realized. As mentioned above, commercialization of technology and 
integration of technology into the private market were not goals of either the Manhattan project or 
Apollo program. For the Manhattan project, it did not matter what the cost was, in one sense, if a 
consequence of failing to build a nuclear weapon was to lose the war. For CO2 capture, the 
primary goal is to develop a technology that would be widely deployed and thus effective at 
removing a substantial amount of CO2 over the next half century or more, which necessarily 
requires its commercialization and widespread use throughout the utility sector. 
The Possibility of Failure: The Synthetic Fuels Corporation 
A careful study of one of the federal projects initiated in response to the energy crisis of the 1970s 
and early 1980s—the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC)—may provide a valuable comparison to 
current thinking about the federal role in CO2 capture technology development: 
The government’s attempt to develop a synthetic fuels industry in the late 1970s and early 
1980s is a case study of unsuccessful federal involvement in technology development. In 
1980, Congress established the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC), a quasi-independent 
corporation, to develop large-scale projects in coal and shale liquefaction and gasification. 
Most of the projects centered on basic and conceptual work that would contribute to 
demonstration programs in later stages, although funds were expended on several prototype 
and full-scale demonstration experiments. Formed in response to the 1970s energy crisis, the 
SFC was intended to support projects that industry was unable to support because of 
technical, environmental, or financial uncertainties. Federal loans, loan guarantees, price 
guarantees, and other financial incentives totaling $20 billion were authorized to spur 
industry action. Although SFC was designed to continue operating until at least 1992, the 
collapse in energy prices, environmental concerns, lack of support from the Reagan 
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Administration, and administrative problems ended the synthetic fuels program in 1986.90 
[citations from original text omitted] 
One of the primary reasons commonly cited for the failure of the SFC was the collapse of crude 
oil prices during the 1980s, although other factors contributed.91 Without a stable and predictable 
price for the commodity that the SFC was attempting to produce in specific, mandated quantities, 
the structure of the SFC was unable to cope with market changes: 
The failure of the federal government’s effort to create a synthetic fuels industry yields 
valuable lessons about the role of government in technology innovation. The synthetic fuels 
program was established without sufficient flexibility to meet changes in market conditions, 
such as the price of fuel. Public unwillingness to endure the environmental costs of some of 
the large-scale projects was an added complication. An emphasis on production targets was 
an added complication. An emphasis on production targets reduced research and program 
flexibility. Rapid turnover among SFC’s high-level officials slowed administrative actions. 
The synthetic fuels program did demonstrate, however, that large-scale synthetic energy 
projects could be build and operated within specified technical parameters.92 [citations from 
original text omitted] 
It may be argued that DOE’s initial decision to “restructure” the FutureGen program (as originally 
conceived, see box above) was partly attributable to the project’s inflexibility in dealing with 
changing market conditions, in this case the rise in materials and construction costs and the 
doubling of FutureGen’s original price estimate. However, the analogy between FutureGen and 
the SFC is limited. Although the SFC failed in part because of collapsing oil prices (the costs of 
the SFC program could be measured against the benefits of producing oil), for FutureGen the 
value of CO2 avoided (i.e., the benefit provided by the technology) is not even calculable for 
comparison to the costs of building the plant, because there is no real global price for CO2. 
The market conditions that contributed to the downfall of the SFC, however, could be very 
different from the market conditions that would arise following the creation of a price for CO2 
emissions. The stability and predictability of the price signal would depend on the mechanism: 
carbon tax, allowance pricing, or auctions. A mechanism that allowed for a long-term price signal 
for carbon would likely benefit CO2 capture technology R&D programs. 
Implications for Climate Change Legislation 
Any comprehensive approach to reducing greenhouse gases substantially must address the 
world’s dependency on coal for one-quarter of its energy demand, including almost half of its 
electricity demand. To maintain coal as a key component in the world’s energy mix in a carbon-
constrained future would require developing a technology to capture and store its CO2 emissions. 
This situation suggests to some that any greenhouse gas reduction program be delayed until such 
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carbon capture technology has been demonstrated. However, technological innovation and the 
demands of a carbon control regime are interlinked; therefore, a technology policy is no substitute 
for environmental policy and must be developed in concert with it.93 
This linkage raises issues for legislators attempting to craft greenhouse gas reduction legislation. 
For the demand-pull side of the equation, the issue revolves around how to create the appropriate 
market for emerging carbon capture technologies. Table 4 compares four different “price” signals 
across five different criteria that influence their effectiveness in promoting technology: 
• Magnitude: What size of price signal or stringency of the regulation is imposed 
initially? 
• Direction: What influences the direction (up or down) of the price signal or 
stringency of the regulation over time? 
• Timing: How quickly is the price or regulation imposed and strengthened? 
• Stability: How stable is the price or regulation over time? 
• Duration: How long is the price or regulation imposed on affected companies? 
In general, the criteria suggest that regulation is the surest method of forcing the development of 
technology—price is not necessarily a direct consideration in decision-making. However, 
regulation is also the most limiting; technologies more or less stringent than the standard would 
have a limited domestic market (although foreign opportunities may be available), and 
development could be frozen if the standards are not reviewed and strengthened periodically. In 
contrast, allowance prices would provide the most equivocal signal, particularly if they are 
allocated free to participants. Experience has shown allowance prices to be subject to volatility 
with swings both up and down. The experience with the SO2 cap-and-trade program suggests the 
incentive can be improved with “bonus” allowances; however, the eligibility criteria used could 
be perceived as the government attempting to pick a winner. 
In contrast, carbon taxes and allowance auctions (particularly 100% auctions with a reserve price) 
provide strong market-based price signals. A carbon tax is the most stable price signal, providing 
a clear and transparent signal of the value of any method of greenhouse gas reductions. 
Substantial auctioning of allowances also places a price on carbon emissions, a price that can be 
strengthened by incorporating a reserve price into the structure of the auction. 
However, each of these signals ultimately depends on the environmental goal envisioned and the 
specifics of the control program: (1) the stringency of the reduction requirement; (2) the timing of 
desired reductions; (3) the techniques allowed to achieve compliance. The interplay of these 
factors informs the technology community about the urgency of the need for carbon capture 
technology; the price signal informs the community what cost-performance parameters are 
appropriate for the emerging carbon market. The nature of that price signal (regulatory, market, 
stability) informs the community of the confidence it can have that it is not wasting capital on a 
“white elephant” or on a project that the market does not want or need. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Various Demand-Pull Mechanisms 
Mechanism Magnitude Direction Timing Stability Duration 
Regulation Depends on available technology 
or performance standard 
Subject to periodic 
review by regulatory 
authorities based on 
technological progress 
Depends on frequency of 
regulatory review and pace of 
technological progress 
Very stable—can become 
stagnant if discourages 
further innovation or 
regulators rarely review 
standard 
Depends on the 




Depends on stringency of 
emissions cap and other 
provisions of the cap-and-trade 
program 
Market-driven based on 
the supply and demand 
for allowances 
Depends on environmental goal 
and specified schedule of 
emission reductions 
Can be quite volatile Depends on 
environmental goal and 
specified schedule of 
emission reductions 
Carbon Tax Depends on level of tax Generally specified by 
legislation 
Depends on escalator provisions 
in legislation 
Stable Depends on the specified 
schedule of the carbon tax 
Allowance 
Auctions 
Same dynamics as allowance 
prices; can be strengthened by 
100% auctioning of allowances 
and specifying a reserve price 
Same dynamics as 
allowance prices unless 
legislation specifies a 
reserve price 
Same dynamics as allowance 
prices unless legislation includes 
a reserve price—then it depends 
on any escalator clause 
Allowance price volatility 
can be tempered by a 
reserve price and the 
specifics of the auctioning 
process 
Same as for allowance 
prices, but includes the 
details of the auctioning 
procedures 
Source: Congressional Research Service. 
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The issues for technology-push mechanisms are broader, and include not only the specifics of any 
reduction program and resulting price signal, but also international considerations and the 
interplay between carbon capture technology, storage, and the potential need for CO2 transport. 
Groups as diverse as The Pew Center, the Electric Power Research Institute, DOE, and MIT have 
suggested “roadmaps” and other schemes for preparing carbon capture technology for a pending 
greenhouse gas reduction program.94 Generally, all of these approaches agree on the need for 
demonstration-size (200-300 MW) projects to sort out technical performance and cost 
effectiveness, and identify potential environmental and safety concerns. The Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) reflected Congress’s desire for more 
integrated demonstration projects, and ARRA provides a dramatic step increase in funding for 
CCS technology over a relatively short period. 
Finally, it should be noted that the status quo for coal with respect to climate change legislation 
isn’t necessarily the same as “business as usual.” The financial markets and regulatory authorities 
appear to be hedging their bets on the outcomes of any federal legislation with respect to 
greenhouse gas reductions, and are becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the risk of a coal-
fired power plant with or without carbon capture capacity. This sort of limbo for coal-fired power 
plants is reinforced by the MIT study, which makes a strong case against subsidizing new 
construction (allowed for IGCC under the EPAct2005) without carbon capture because of the 
unattractive costs of retrofits: 
Coal plants will not be cheap to retrofit for CO2 capture. Our analysis confirms that the costs 
to retrofit an air-driven SCPC [supercritical pulverized coal] plant for significant CO2 
capture, say 90%, will be greater than the costs to retrofit an IGCC plant. However, ... the 
modifications needed to retrofit an IGCC plant for appreciable CCS are extensive and not a 
matter of simply adding a single simple and inexpensive process step to an existing IGCC 
plant.... Consequently, IGCC plants without CCS that receive assistance under the 2005 
Energy Act will be more costly to retrofit and less likely to do so. 
The concept of a “capture ready” IGCC or pulverized coal plant is as yet unproven and 
unlikely to be fruitful. The Energy Act envisions “capture ready” to apply to gasification 
technology. [citation omitted] Retrofitting IGCC plants, or for that matter pulverized coal 
plants, to incorporate CCS technology involves substantial additional investments and a 
significant penalty to the efficiency and net electricity output of the plant. As a result, we are 
unconvinced that such financial assistance to conventional IGCC plants without CCS is 
wise.95 [emphasis in original] 
As noted earlier, lack of a regulatory scheme (or carbon price) presents numerous risks to any 
research and development effort designed to develop carbon capture technology. Ultimately, it 
also presents a risk to the future of coal. 
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